United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

To be argued by
WILLIAM I. ARONWALD

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

In re Grand Jury Subpoena

of

ALPHONSE PERSICO,

Appellant

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of New York,
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STATEMENT

On January 23, 1974, appellant was subpoenaed before a special grand jury sitting in Brooklyn, New York, which is investigating racketeering influence in legitimate businesses in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962. Appellant was granted testimonial immunity and subsequently testified that he was the "boss" of an illegal gambling enterprise but refused to identify those individuals who were employed by him. The Honorable Orrin G. Judd found appellant in civil contempt pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1826 and sentenced him to sixty days in the custody of the United States Marshal. Appellant did not purge himself of his contempt, served his sentence, and was subsequently released. As stated in appellant's brief, the details of those proceedings are reflected in the opinion of this Court, In re Persico, 491 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1974).

The Government thereafter attempted to re-subpoena appellant to appear before the same grand jury but was unsuccessful until November 27, 1974 despite continued efforts by the agents of Federal Bureau of Investigation to locate him, and despite notice to appellant's counsel, on numerous occasions, of the grand jury's intention.

As stated in his brief, appellant filed a motion seeking inter alia: 1) that the Government file an affidavit pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3504; 2) that it demonstrate the special attorney's lawful authority to participate in the

aforesaid grand jury proceeding; and, 3) that the appellant has a right to inspect all supporting papers authorizing electronic surveillance of appellant or in the alternative produce said documents for an in camera inspection by the Court. Judge Judd upheld the Government's response to appellant's Section 3504 motion, denied the other sundry motions, and ordered appellant to testify pursuant to the Order granting him testimonial immunity.

On February 5, 1975, appellant again was asked to identify those individuals who were employed by him in his gambling enterprise. Appellant refused and was adjudged in civil contempt by Judge Judd and sentenced to the custody of the United States Marshal for the duration of the grand jury's term.

Appellant was granted a stay of Judge Judd's Order until February 11, 1975 in order to apply to this Court for a stay pending appeal. Said application was denied and appellant has been committed in accordance with Judge Judd's Order. On February 24, 1975, this Court denied appellant's application for bail pending this appeal.

A R G U M E N T

POINT 1

I. A JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ATTORNEY, ASSIGNED BY AN ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL TO INVESTIGATE CRIMES AND CONDUCT GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS MAY PROPERLY APPEAR AND QUESTION WITNESSES BEFORE THE GRAND JURY.

This is one of a series of cases, now proliferating, following Judge Oliver's opinions in United States v. Williams, 74 Cr. 47-W-1 (W.D. Mo), decided October 21, 1974, November 15, 1974, and December 3, 1974 which question the authority of organized crime strike force attorneys to appear and present evidence to a grand jury. The contentions are being raised by immunized witnesses, as here, who base their refusal to answer grand jury questions on the ground that the government attorney has no authority to appear and question them before the grand jury. See also e.g. Sandello v. Curran, M 11-188 (S.D. N.Y.), decided February 27, 1975; In re Jerry Langella, 74C. 638 (E.D.N.Y.), decided February 27, 1975. They are also being raised by defendants as a ground for dismissal of an indictment. See e.g. United States v. Crispino, 74 Cr. 932 (S.D. N.Y.), decided February 13, 1975, motion for reconsideration pending; United States v. Brown, 74 Cr. 867 (S.D. N.Y.), decided February 24, 1975; United States v. Jacobson, 74 Cr. 936 (S.D. N.Y.), decided March 3, 1975.

The attorney here, Robert Del Grosso, falls within the terms of Rules 6(d) and 54(c), F.R.Crim.P. as a government attorney who is permitted to participate in grand jury proceedings.[1/] He is a regular Department of Justice Criminal Division Attorney assigned to its Organized Crime Section and to its field office in Brooklyn. In this role, he operates under the supervision of the Assistant Attorney General, the Section Chief, the Deputy Section Chief and the Attorney-In-Charge of the field office.[2/] The latter coordinates his efforts with the local United States Attorney who in turn generally signs applications for immunity orders and usually reviews and signs all indictments returned by the Grand Jury.

Each Organized Crime Section attorney who presents evidence before the grand jury does so only after he obtains, as indicia of his authority, a letter of authorization signed by an Assistant Attorney General and files it, along with a copy of his duly executed oath of office, with the Clerk of the District

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1/ Rule 6(d) states that "attorneys for the government, the witness under examination, interpreters when needed and, for the purpose of taking the evidence, a stenographer or operator of a recording device may be present while the grand jury is in session." Rule 54(c) defines "attorney for the government" as including "an authorized assistant of the Attorney General" and "an authorized assistant of a United States Attorney."

2/ The field offices were first established in 1966. See e.g. Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States 1973 pp. 78-81. which gives a report to Congress about the Operation of the field office. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. H.R. 91st Cong., 2d Sess., August 13 and September 15, 1970 at pp. 83-120 where Department Representatives testified about the strike force concept to a Congressional Committee. See also Note, The Strike Force: Organized Law Enforcement v. Organized Crime, 1970 Columbia Journal Law and Social Problems, 496.

Court.[3] This procedure follows a long established practice in the Department of Justice. Under this practice, the letter commonly recites that the attorney, even a regular department attorney, has been "specially retained and appointed as a Special Attorney under the authority of the Department of Justice" and specially authorized and retained to conduct legal proceedings including grand jury proceedings and that the attorney is to serve "without compensation other than the compensation you are now receiving under existing appointment."[4] When the letter makes specific mention of the particular statutes into whose violation the grand jury intends to inquire, it also commonly includes a catch-all phrase, "other criminal laws of the United States." The letter, however, may not mention any specific statute and may simply recite that the inquiry covers various criminal laws of the United States.[5]

3/ Neither a letter nor an oath is a prerequisite for a grand jury appearance by a government attorney. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 216 F. Supp. 250, 256 (D. Minn. 1962), affirmed, 382 U.S. 44 (1965). For example, Assistant United States Attorneys may appear before the grand jury in their home districts without letters of authorization. The oath and salary limitations of 28 U.S.C. 515(b), which is derived from the Act of June 22, 1870, discussed infra, apply only to the appointment of specially retained outside counsel, not officers of the Department. Prior to first entering on duty, each attorney of the Department executes the oath swearing to "faithfully discharge the duties of the office" he is about to enter.

4/ Anti-trust Division Attorneys generally are "specially retained and appointed under the authority of the Department of Justice" without any recitation that they are Special Attorneys.

5/ The practice of filing a letter of authorization does not stem from any statute or regulation. However, in May v. United States, 236 F.2d 495, 500 (8th Cir. 1916), the first case to interpret 34 Stat. 816 (1906), now 28 U.S.C. 515(a), the Eighth Circuit specifically asked that copies of the letter appointing specially retained counsel and his oath of office be presented "to any court in which the assistant attorney is called upon to act." Such a filing serves the function of keeping the district courts apprized

(Footnote Cont'd)

The primary issue here is whether such an attorney becomes an unauthorized person before the grand jury if his appointment letter authorizes him to conduct any kind of legal proceeding including grand jury proceedings "which United States Attorneys" are authorized to conduct rather than reciting some form of limitation on the inquiry that he may conduct. Appellant contends that as Mr. Del Grosso in his capacity as a government attorney is an "attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General" under 28 U.S.C. §515 he must be "specifically directed by the Attorney General" to conduct some particular inquiry before the grand jury. Our position is that Del Grosso may properly appear before the grand jury as a government attorney under Rule 6 and conduct an inquiry in like manner as a United States Attorney without such specific direction. We first show that this authority derives from the power of the Attorney General to conduct federal criminal litigation. We then focus on 28 U.S.C. 515, the statute considered by the district courts which have ruled against the government, and a related statute, 28 U.S.C. 543, and argue that, even under these specific statutes, the Attorney General has power to assign a department attorney to conduct grand jury inquiries in the same manner as a United States Attorney. We next show that the Attorney General's power to assign Criminal Division attorneys to a grand jury has properly been delegated to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of

(Footnote Cont'd Here)
of the particular government attorney whether specially retained or a regular officer, who are appearing before its grand juries. Over the years, the letters of authorization have been modified.

that division. Finally, we contend that a grand jury witness may not complain about the scope of authority of a government attorney to conduct a grand jury inquiry.

A. The Attorney General Has The Power To Conduct Federal Criminal Litigation And May Assign His Subordinate Officers To Conduct a Grand Jury Proceeding With The Same Wide Latitude Of Inquiry As The Grand Jury Itself.

It is settled law that the Executive Branch - specifically, the Attorney General - has the power to conduct federal criminal litigation including absolute discretion whether to prosecute. It is "an executive function within the exclusive prerogative of the Attorney General." United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 190 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (concurring opinion of Judge Wisdom). Accordingly, under the broad ambit of statutes under which the Attorney General operates, he may appoint officials "to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States," 28 U.S.C. §533. He has supervision of all litigation in which the United States is a party and is commanded to "direct all United States Attorneys, Assistant United States Attorneys, and special attorneys appointed under section 543 . . . in the discharge of their respective duties" 28 U.S.C. §519. He may appoint assistant United States Attorneys in any district in which they reside, see 28 U.S.C. §545, or "appoint special attorneys, regardless of their residence, to assist United States attorneys when the public interest so requires" 28 U.S.C. §§542, 543. He may direct any officer of the Department of Justice to conduct and argue any case in any court of the United States, 28 U.S.C. §518. He also may direct "any other

officer of the Department of Justice or any attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General under law . . . when specifically directed by the Attorney General" to conduct any kind of legal proceedings "including grand jury proceedings", 28 U.S.C. 515. Moreover, since 28 U.S.C. 509, deriving from the Reorganization Acts of 1949 and 1950, vests all functions of the Department of Justice, with some exceptions in the Attorney General, the statute for delegation appearing in 28 U.S.C. 510 is essential so that he may "make such provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance by an officer . . . of any function of the Attorney General." See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, (1974). On his part, the United States Attorney, an appointee of the President, has the duty "except as otherwise provided by law" to prosecute all offenses against the United States within his district, 28 U.S.C. 547.

Recently, the Supreme Court considered these principles and some of these statutes in ruling on the justiciability issue involving the Watergate Special Prosecutor and the President in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. (1974). The Supreme Court unequivocally stated that "the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute." It also pointed out at :

> Under the authority of Art. II, § 2, Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government. 28 U.S.C. § 516. It has also vested in him the power to appoint subordinate officers to assist him in the discharge of his duties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515,

> 533. Acting pursuant to these statutes, the Attorney General has delegated the authority to represent the United States in these particular matters to a Special Prosecutor with unique authority and tenure.

Clearly therefore, the Attorney General has authority to assign other officers of the Department of Justice, not only under 28 U.S.C. 515, but also under the other statutes giving him power over criminal litigation. If it were otherwise then his broad power to conduct criminal litigation would be seriously hampered at its inception - the initiation of a criminal case by presenting evidence before grand juries.

We have focused so far on the general authority of the Attorney General over federal criminal cases. But this power may not be considered in a vacuum. Not only may no serious criminal case be commenced without a grand jury indictment, but a grand jury itself has wide latitude to conduct an inquiry into violation of criminal laws. As the Supreme Court recently observed in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974):

> Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide latitude to inquire into violations of criminal law. No judge presides to monitor its proceedings. It deliberates in secret and may determine alone the course of its inquiry. The grand jury may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedures and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials. "It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime." Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).

Both the power of the Attorney General to designate an attorney to conduct a grand jury inquiry and the power of the grand jury to investigate would be circumscribed, despite the principles expressed in Calandra and Blair, if the Attorney General could not direct that his assigned officer could question as broadly as the scope of the inquiry. It would restrain the inquiry with a "technical procedural" rule - the scope of the authority of the Justice Department lawyer. It would mean that questions by jurors themselves outside these bounds would be out of order. It would require that the inquiry "be limited narrowly by . . . forecasts of the probable results of the investigation" despite the fact that the jury's role is to find probable cause. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 117(1973) We submit, therefore, that the Attorney General's power to assign attorneys to a grand jury inquiry is of necessity as broad as the inquiry itself or, in other words, as broad an inquiry as "United States Attorneys are authorized by law to conduct."

B. Apart From Other Statutes, The Plain Language of 28 U.S.C. 543 And 28 U.S.C. 515 Gives The Attorney General Power To Assign Government Attorneys To Conduct Any Kind Of Legal Proceedings Which United States Attorneys Are Authorized To Conduct.

Turning from the broad statutory framework under which the Attorney General conducts the criminal litigation of the United States and focusing on the statutes to which the recent decisions of the district courts have directed their attention, 28 U.S.C. 515 and 543, the plain language of these statutes show that the Attorney General has the power to assign an attorney of the

Department of Justice to conduct a grand jury inquiry with the same breadth as an inquiry conducted by a United States Attorney.

1. Section 543 gives the Attorney General power to appoint "attorneys to assist United States Attorneys when the public interest so requires." This grant of power is similar to his authority under section 542 to appoint Assistant United States Attorneys "when the public interest so requires." Neither statute contains any words of limitation on the power of these appointees to conduct criminal proceedings, including grand jury proceedings. We are aware of no authority that suggest that an Assistant United States Attorney cannot conduct a broad grand jury inquiry by virtue of his office. A departmental or special attorney appointed under section 543 would likewise be subject to no limitation. We submit that the letter of appointment of Mr. Del Grosso can reasonably be read to be an appointment under this section.

There remains the question of whether the organizational structure of the organized crime strike forces precludes a conclusion that its attorneys were appointed to "assist" the United States Attorney. In our view, a finding that they are endeavoring to investigate and prosecute "organized crime" in a particular district constitutes assistance to the United States Attorney for that district. In any event, where as here the United States Attorney reviews and signs all indictments and the organized crime prosecutions are coordinated with him, it is clear that the attorneys of the strike force are "assisting" the United States Attorney.

In short, as Judge Frankel observed in United States v. Jacobson, supra (slip opinion pp. 3-4):

> Judge Judd in United States v. Albanese, supra, noted the broad authority of the Attorney General under 28 U.S.C. §§ 542 and 543(a) to appoint Assistant United States Attorneys and "attorneys to assist United States Attorneys" all over the country. The thrust of this statutory framework is against the straitened and sharply technical view urged by our movant. The head of a Department for a nation of over 213,000,000 people ought not to be required, either personally or through the Presidential appointees in his sub-cabinet posts, to appoint attorneys, one by one for specific cases. To be sure, large powers may be abused. Equally surely, and sadly, monstrous abuses have lately happened. But we must go on. It will not do for the judges to strain for grammatical traps to find violations of the Congressional will where (a) the statutory text compels no such finding, (b) the Congress is entirely content with the questioned action and could otherwise readily stop it, and (c) the result of the technical obstruction would be at best a temporary drag upon enforcement of the criminal law.

2. Section 515(a) provides that the "Attorney General or any officer of the Department of Justice, or any attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General under law, may, when specifically directed by the Attorney General, conduct any kind of legal proceedings, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings and proceedings before committing magistrates, which United States attorneys are authorized by law to conduct, whether or not he is a resident of the district in which the proceedings is brought." The language of Section 515(a) thus expressly provides that an attorney may be "specifically designated" to conduct "any kind of legal proceedings . . . which United States attorneys are authorized by law to conduct",

and the letters of authorization in question expressly state the attorney is "specifically authorized and directed to file informations . . . and to conduct . . . any kind of legal proceedings . . . including grand jury proceedings . . . which United States Attorneys are authorized to conduct." The plain meaning thus permits the Attorney General to give the assigned attorney a specific direction to conduct grand jury proceedings like the United States Attorney. Upon this basis, alone, the letter of authorization was sufficient.

But even if the words "specifically directed" are read to require a specific limitation in the proceedings to which a special attorney is assigned, as the district court concluded in Crispino, supra, it does not follow that this construction is applicable to regular attorneys of the Department of Justice. The statute applies to three categories of attorneys, the Attorney General, any officer of the Department of Justice, and an attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General. The phrase "specifically directed" obviously does not apply to the Attorney General himself. Since section 510, permits him to delegate this power to other officers of the department, there is no reason to read section 515(a) to make the phrase "specifically directed" apply to "any officer of the Department of Justice". In other words, if "specifically directed" is a limitation, it should be read to be applicable in the words of the statute only to "any attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General under law (who) may, when specifically directed conduct any kind of legal proceeding." Again under this reading,

Mr. Del Grosso had legal authority to conduct a broad grand jury inquiry. As a regular attorney in the Department of Justice, he qualifies under common usage as an officer of the Department of Justice. See e.g. the use by the Supreme Court of that term in United States v. Giordano, supra, and the discussion of the 1870 Act creating the Department of Justice, infra.

In sum, as Judge Pollock construed this section in United States v. Brown, supra, slip opinion pp. 12-13:

> Since the statute does not confine its application to particular facts or particular defendants, it would appear appropriate for the Courts to implement the public policies to be served through Strike Forces by upholding a broad grant of authority and to sustain a commission that directs members of the specially selected Strike Force to prosecute any kind of legal proceeding. Indeed to hold that such commissions are insufficiently specific would not serve any public purpose but might have mischievous and drastic effects as a precedent against the current needs of law enforcement across the county. No fundamental rights are at stake here that need be conserved in the constitutional interests of criminal targets. There is a strong public interest in implementing the broad purposes of the Congress and the executive by upholding the authority of the special prosecutors of the Strike Force.

Or, as Judge Frankel observed in Jacobson, supra slip opinion pp. 2-3:

> As has been shown in the several opinions recently announced, the plain language of 28 U.S.C. §515 is comfortably read to validate the questioned appointments of special attorneys. The special attorney involved here received a letter of authority which, in literal terms, "specifically directed * * * (the) conduct (of) any kind of legal proceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings * * *." There is, to be sure, arguable ground for a contrary view. However, where the question is one of asserted deviation from the command of Congress,

> it is a matter of at least some significance that the appointment and widespread employment of Strike Force attorneys has been one of the most publicized activities of the Department of Justice during the last decade. Reports of the Attorney General have, as Judge Werker noted repeatedly highlighted these activities. Congress has been made clearly aware of the enterprise - through specific discussions at committee hearings as well as other means. The national operations of Strike Force attorneys have been funded without apparent question and with no intimation of doubt as to the authority on which these efforts were proceeding. "The repeated appropriations * * * not only confirms (sic) the departmental construction of the statute, but constitutes (sic) a ratification of the action * * *." Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 361 (1941) (footnote omitted). See also Fleming v. Mohawk Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947); Isbranetsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139, 147 (1937); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).

Moreover, as the Court noted in United States v. Brown, supra, slip opinion pp. 9-10:

> "The statutory requirement of a specifically directed authorization was apparently enacted in an atmosphere of the appointment of individual special prosecutors with particularized experience for particular cases. But this should not be and has not been interpreted as a requirement to thwart the comprehensive sweep of the statutory language, which was to facilitate the government's prosecutorial efforts, when unleashed by the Attorney General to deal with rackets and organized crime through an elite corps of the government's prosecutors."

Finally, in Brown, supra, slip opinion p. 14, Judge Pollack citing Haberman v. Finch, 418 F.2d 664, 666 (2d Cir. 1969) noted:

> "It is a familiar maxim of statutory interpretation that Courts should enforce a statute in such a manner that its overriding purpose will be achieved, even if the words used leave room for a contrary interpretation".

The Government respectfully submits that the scope of Mr. Del Grosso's authority is not regulated or governed by his letter of authorization, which the Government contends is merely indicia of his authority, but rather by his superiors - including the Attorney General - in the Department of Justice. In Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954) the United States Attorney had presented evidence relating to violations of the Internal Revenue Code to a grand jury without having first obtained authorization to do so from the Attorney General as he was required to do by an Executive Order issued by the Attorney General. The grand jury filed an indictment. On appeal the failure of the United States Attorney to comply with the provisions of the Executive Order was asserted as grounds for dismissal of the indictment. In rejecting this claim the Court held at 173-74:

> "The evidence was presented by the District Attorney, who was a representative of the Department of Justice, notwithstanding that he failed to comply with the departmental directive. For this he is answerable to the Department, but his action before the grand jury was not subject to attack by one indicted by the grand jury on such evidence."

Indeed in construing the purport of the Executive Order the Supreme Court noted that its purpose was to transfer responsibility for tax prosecutions to the Department of Justice and was not intended to direct how such responsibility should be exercised. By the same token it is submitted that Congress in enacting 28 United States Code §515(a), and the other relevant statutes cited herein, merely defined the scope of the inherent power of the Attorney General as the Chief Executive of the Department of Justice and did not manifest any intent to direct how this power or responsibility was to be exercised. Thus where a departmental or special attorney exceeds his authority, it is submitted that the matter is one which should more properly be considered by the Department of Justice rather than by the Courts.

C. The legislative history of 28 U.S.C. 515 does not undermine the broad statutory authority granted to the Attorney General to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States.

We believe that the plain wording of the statute does not require resort to the legislative history of section 515. However, we shall consider that history in light of the fact this was the prime basis for Judge Werker's conclusion in United States v. Crispino, supra, that the Attorney General has no power to give blanket authority to a Department of Justice attorney to conduct a grand jury inquiry in a particular judicial district. This history neither undermines the plain wording of this statute nor the broad statutory authority granted to the Attorney General to conduct criminal litigation. Rather the history of the 1906 Act, from which section 515 originated, shows its purpose was to expand rather than contract the right of the Attorney General and his subordinates to conduct grand jury proceedings.

1. The 1861 and 1870 Acts. These two acts serve as a background to our consideration of the 1906 Act. In the Act of August 21, 1861, 12 Stat. 285, Congress provided that the Attorney General of the United States was "charged with the general superintendence and direction of the District attorneys ... as to the manner of discharging their respective duties." He was also "empowered, whenever

in his opinion the public interest may require it, to employ and retain (in the name of the United States) such attorneys and counselors-at-law as he may think necessary to assist the District Attorney in the discharge of their duties and shall stipulate with such assistant counsel the amount of compensation". The latter section which has remained substantially unchanged is now codified as 28 U.S.C. 543(a).

The Act of June 22, 1870, 16 Stat. 162, which created the Department of Justice resulted in large measure out of abuses in the employment of outside counsel, including the payment of excessive fees and the sometime inferior quality of their services.[6] This legislation in section 5, 16 Stat. 163, consolidated in

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6. See e.g. the following passages from the Congressional Globe:

> This bill ... put an end to a system which might be perverted to purposes of favoritism.
>
> Under various laws, and sometimes, perhaps, without any very definite law, a practice has grown up largely since 1860 of giving employment to counsel for the Government in almost every conceivable capacity and under a great variety of circumstances - to counsel who are not officers of the Government, nor amenable as such. Under appropriations for collecting the revenues, and other general purposes, very large fees have been paid for services which could have been performed by proper law officers at much less expense.
>
> * * *
>
> The contingent funds of the Departments are now sometimes used to employ counsel. And in all the forms and under whatever authority counsel are employed there is now no limit on the fees that may be paid and none of the sanctions of official authority. Cong. Globe,

(Footnote cont'd)

a single department the regular salaried staff of government officers, who were empowered to attend to the interests of the United States "in any suit pending ... or to attend to any other interest of the United States" under direction of and on behalf of the Attorney General.[7] With respect

(Footnote cont'd here)
41st Cong. 2nd Sess. 3038 (1870): House debates).
One of the objects of this bill is to establish a staff of law officers sufficiently numerous and of sufficient ability to transact this law business of the Government in all parts of the United States. Id. at 3035.

* * *

Retainers of $3,000 and $7,500 have been sent to counsel in other parts of the United States. Some have rendered service, and some we cannot find rendered any at all ... Id. at 3038-3039.

* * *

the design (of the bill) is to prevent the appointment of those who are not responsible men - that is, officers for temporary duties, and whose charges are in excess of the fees paid to regular officers in the way of salary. ... The real object of this bill, to diminish the expense which the Government of the United States is now at for temporary legal assistants, and to substitute therefor a class of officers on fixed salaries who shall be regulated by law. I take it for granted, considering the highly respectable and discreet source from which this bill originates, that the object of the bill is retrenchment. The object of the bill is the prevention of what I may call the sporadic system of paying fees to persons, not to speak disrespectfully of them, who may be called departmental favorites. It is to regulate that which I think is an abuse. ****
In case [special] deputies are absolutely needed ... they are to have a special commission, and to act under the Attorney General. Id. at 4490 (Senate debates)

7. In specific terms, Section 5 provided that:
...the Attorney General may, whenever he deems it for the interest of the United States, conduct and argue any case in which the government is interested, in any court of the United States, or may require the Solicitor General or any officer of the Department of Justice to do so. And the Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice may be sent by the Attorney General to any State
(Footnote cont'd)

to the future expenditures for retention of outside (non-Department of Justice) counsel, to "assist in the trial of any case". Section 17 provided (16 Stat. 164) that the need for such counsel was to be publicly stated prior to their employment, and the scope of their commission was not to exceed this stated need:

> ...no counsel or attorney fees shall hereafter be allowed to any person or persons, for services in such capacity to the United States, or any branch or department of the government thereof, unless hereafter authorized by law and then only on the certificate of the Attorney General that such services were actually rendered, and that the same could not be performed by the Attorney General, or Solicitor General, or the officers of the department of justice, or by the district attorneys. And every attorney and counsel [1] or who shall be specially retained, under the authority of the Department of Justice, to assist in the trial of any case in which the government is interested, shall receive a commission from the head of said Department as a special assistant to the Attorney General, or to some one of the district attorneys, as the nature of the appointment may require, and shall take the oath required by law to be taken by the district attorneys, and shall be subject to all the liabilities imposed upon such officers by law. (Emphasis added).

(Footnote cont'd here)
or district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in any suit pending in any of the courts of the United States, or in the courts of any State, or to attend to any other interest of the United States; for which service they shall receive, in addition to their salaries, their actual and necessary expenses, while so absent from the seat of government, the account thereof to be verified by affidavit. (Emphasis added).

In the Congressional debates, it was made clear that the Attorney General would be held responsible for the special need to expend funds to retain outside counsel and for the quality of their performance.[8] This was to be accomplished by requiring that the need for outside counsel and the purposes for which he was retained be specified on the face of each special commission "in order that [counsel] may be responsible to him [the Attorney General] and to the government for the performance of their duties."[9] Thus,

8 "There will of course have to be employed some special assistants ... they will be appointed by special commission, receiving a fee to be agreed upon or determined by the Attorney General, and by him alone, and which in no case will exceed the compensation properly allowable for the service rendered."

* * *

If the Attorney General cannot try the case and the emergency requires assistant counsel, he can employ [outside counsel]. It is then done by the head of the law department... He is responsible as the chief law officer of the Government. If any error is committed we shall know who is chargeable with it. We have then the assurance, if he be the proper person, that the office will be administered economically. Congressional Globe, supra at 3036-3037.

9 These remarks came from the following statement in the Congressional Globe, supra at 3035:

"... if the Attorney General, under the authority given him by existing law, shall employ assistant counsel in any district he shall designate those counsel as assistant district attorneys or assistants to the Attorney General, and give them commissions as such in the special business with which they are charged, in order that they may be responsible to him and to the Government for the performance of their duties. The committee have been convinced most thoroughly by our investigations that no person should be charged with the conduct of litigation in behalf of the United States unless he holds a commission under the United States and is responsible to the law and the proper authorities." (Emphasis added).

Congress in establishing the Department of Justice showed no concern that its employees would interfere with the functions of the District Attorneys and gave the Attorney General power to use the persons he employed to attend to any interest of the United States. The primary Congressional concern was that the commissions be granted to outside counsel employed by the Attorney General so that their responsibility to the Attorney General would be clearly evidenced.

2. The Rosenthal, Cobban and Twining cases. Three district court cases also are a background to consideration of the 1906 Act.

In United States v. Rosenthal, 121 Fed. 862 (C.C.S.D.N.Y., 1903), the district court, proceeding on what we view to be a variety of erroneous premises, dismissed an indictment because a specially retained "assistant to the Attorney General became in fact the chief officer in the conduct of the investigation before the grand jury ...." 121 Fed. 872. The district court's premises were that: (1) the Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1868) held that the Attorney General and his officers had no power over any case or authority to appear before a grand jury in a criminal proceeding until after indictment despite the various statutes giving the Attorney General power over "cases in any court" and "any other interest

of the United States"; (2) the statute empowering the appointment of special attorneys only authorized them "to assist in the trial of any case"; and (3) officers of the Department of Justice were limited to persons appointed by the President and with the advice or consent of the Senate.

However, the issue decided in the Confiscation cases was that an Attorney General could dismiss a forfeiture suit over the objection of an informer. The facts thus do not involve, and the opinion does not discuss, the relative rights of the Attorney General vis-a-vis the United States Attorneys before grand juries. On the contrary, it repeatedly paraphrases the 1861 act which provides that the Attorney General is responsible for the general supervision and ultimate control of all the duties of the United States Attorneys.

In addition, with respect to the language in Section 5 of the 1870 act which explicitly gave the Attorney General the right to "conduct and argue any case in any court" and "attend to any other interest of the United States," 16 Stat. 163, in Rosenthal the court merely adhered to its erroneous interpretation of the Confiscation Cases and flatly rejected the language in Councilmen v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892) which held that a "criminal case" includes grand jury proceedings.

Finally, as for the district court's narrow interpretation of the term "officers," Section 9 of the 1870 act, 16 Stat. 163, after listing the officers of the Department of Justice that shall be appointed with the advise and consent of the Senate, provides that "all the other officers" of the Department shall be appointed by the Attorney General.

Thereafter, United States v. Cobban 127 Fed. 713, 717 (D. Mont. 1904), and United States v. Twining, 132 Fed. 129, 131 (D. N.J. 1904), both rejected the Rosenthal construction, of what is now 28 U.S.C. 543 and 515(b). Cobban concluded that a special assistant to the United States Attorney could properly appear before the grand jury and Twining, in overruling motions to quash indictments, concluded the Department of Justice could appoint a special assistant to the District Attorney under what is now 28 U.S.C. 543 and authorize him to appear before the grand jury.

3. The Act of June 30, 1906. The express purpose of the bill as reflected in the House Committee report supports the Government's position (H.R. Rep. No. 2901, 59th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 1):[10]

> The purpose of this bill is to give to the Attorney General, or to any officer in his

10 The majority and minority reports of House Committee that considered the 1906 Act which became Section 515(a) are set forth in Judge Weker's opinion in Crispino (slip opinion pp. 8-10, Note 21 at p. V).

> Department or to any attorney specially employed by him, the same rights, powers, and authority which district attorneys now have or may hereafter have in presenting and conducting proceedings before a grand jury or committing magistrate.

Nor is this broad purpose limited by the other language in the report, upon which Judge Werker relied in Crispino in which the committee speaks of special counsel having "special fitness" to assist the Attorney General in a "special case". The statute also is not restricted by the fact that the legislation was directed at the Rosenthal decision.

In the first place, when the Report discussed the employment of "special counsel," it was in fact concerned only with specially retained outside counsel. This obviously is the reason that the Report repeatedly cautions the Attorney General that the expanded use of specially retained counsel should be accompanied by the appropriate justifications on the record. Apparently, this Congress, like the 1870 Congress, was concerned about abuses in the employment of such counsel.[11]

Second, the Attorney General did not request that the right to appear before grand juries be granted or restored

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11 Specific justifications or limitations were not contained, nor found lacking, in the commission sent in United States v. Crosthwaite, 168 U.S. 375, 376, 377 (1897). There, the special counsel involved was not specially retained, but a regular salaried officer of the Department of Justice and not entitled to any extra-compensation.

to himself or to the other salaried officers in his regular employ. Rather as the report states:

> The Attorney General states that it is necessary ... that he shall be permitted to employ special [outside] counsel to assist the district attorneys ... and that such counsel be permitted ... to appear before a grand jury either with the district attorney or alone.
>
> It seems eminently proper that such power and authority be given by law. It has been the practice to do so in the past and it will be necessary that the practice shall continue in the future. H. Rep. No. 2901, supra at 2.

Indeed the minority report, which the majority did not question, recognized that the Attorney General could appear before a grand jury.[12] Thus, it is clear that Congress did not accept the construction in Rosenthal, supra, that the Attorney General and other officers of the Department could not participate in grand jury proceedings.

Third, the Report also states, supra at 2:

> The Attorney General states that it is necessary, in the due and proper administration of the law, that he shall be permitted to employ special counsel to assist the district attorney in cases which district attorneys or lawyers do not generally possess, and in cases of such usual (sic) importance to the Government, and that such counsel be permitted to possess all of the power and authority, in that particular case, granted to the district attorney, which, of course, includes his right to appear before a grand jury either with the district attorney or alone. (Emphasis added).

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12 The minority report states in pertinent part:

> It seems to us that part of the bill as reported should be stricken out, especially in view of the fact that the Attorney General himself has the right in any case of sufficient importance to appear in person. H. Rep. No. 2901, supra at 3.

We submit that the other lawyers in the Department of Justice are "lawyers" referred to above. Such a reading shows that the Report acknowledged that the use of other department lawyers need not to be justified in the same manner as the use of specially retained counsel.[13]

Finally, there is no suggestion in the report that the act was intended to modify or cutback on the right of a government attorney to appear before a grand jury and participate in other proceedings under what now is section 543.

D. Under the three decided appellate cases, the government attorney here may properly appear and question appellant before the grand jury.

The three appellate cases which have interpreted 28 U.S.C. 515 ruled that the assigned attorneys whether regular

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13 The Senate version of the bill (S. 2969) was introduced on June 11, 1906 two weeks before the House bill (H.R. 17714) was passed and referred to the Senate. The Senate did not use the words "specifically directed by the Attorney General." See Crispino, supra, slip opinion Note 17. The Senate Report advised that it is frequently desirable and even necessary that the Attorney General detail an officer of the Department of Justice, or, where this is impractical, appoint a special assistant to the Attorney General, or special counsel to act independently of the United States Attorney, particularly in criminal matters and that the attorneys described in the bill should have the power to conduct proceedings before a grand jury. See, S. Rep. 3835, 59th Cong. 1st Sess (1906). See Crispino, supra slip opinion, Note 17.

An earlier version of the bill (H.R. 11264) listed particular officers of the Department of Justice who could participate in grand jury and court proceedings. The fact that the bill as passed used the term "officers" rather than particular officers such as the Assistants Attorney General, is an indication that "officers" covers other attorneys in the Department of Justice.

retained government attorneys or specially retained counsel could properly represent the government in the proceeding involved. The rationale of these decision however, has been different. But under all of the theories adopted, the government attorney here may properly appear and question appellant before the grand jury.

In May v. United States, 236 Fed. 495, 500 (8th Cir., 1916) one Robert Childs was specially retained at $25.00 per day plus expenses pursuant to a letter signed by an Assistant Attorney General, to assist in the preparation and trial "in the Eastern District of Missouri," of the so-called "Oleomargarine Cases". After stating that the 1906 Act permitted the Attorney General to retain special counsel "personally or through his lawful assistants, the court concluded (236 Fed. at 500):

> This is not a proceeding to try the title of Mr. Childs to the office of special assistant to the Attorney General for the purposes mentioned in the appointment. It is a motion to quash an indictment for the reason that an unauthorized person took part in the proceedings of the grand jury which resulted in the indictment. Such a motion only attacks the authority of Mr. Childs in a collateral way, and beyond all question he was a de facto officer, acting by color of authority, and his acts are valid until it is judicially declared by a competent tribunal in a proceeding for that purpose that he has no right to the office, the duties of which he is performing.

Here, Mr. Del Grosso was more than a de facto officer. He was a regular Department of Justice attorney who under Judge Werker's opinion could investigate "organized crime" cases. Thus, assuming arguendo that his authority was excessive, it could not be subject to attack "in a collateral way".

In Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 113-114 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. den., 313 U.S. 574, the defendants alleged that three "special assistants to the Attorney General" participated in the proceedings before the grand jury without having been specifically directed to do so by the Attorney General. Each commission evidenced the appointment of the person named as "special assistant to the Attorney General" and specifically directed him to conduct in the Eastern District of Louisiana, proceedings in which the United States was interested, including grand jury proceedings. In some of the commissions there was mention of the mail fraud statute, in which the violations are stated to have been committed by named persons "and other persons unknown." None of the commissions evidencing appointment specifically referred to any person indicted. The Court in refusing to abate the indictment on this ground concluded (117 F.2d at 114):

> We think it appears that these persons had and acted in an official status with respect to this case, and that the authority of each extended specifically to appearing in grand jury proceedings in the Eastern District of Louisiana in prosecutions under the mail fraud statute. The mention of persons supposed to be guilty was too general to restrict the authority to cases against them only. When a grand jury, which is an inquisitorial body, begins an investigation it cannot be known in advance whom they will

> indict. .... The words of Section 310, "When thereunto specifically directed by the Attorney General, [to] conduct any kind of legal proceeding", are mainly for the protection of the United States. They do not require the naming of the persons or the particular cases to be prosecuted. Mail fraud cases in the Eastern District of Louisiana were specifically enough mentioned here, and we think it would be going too far to hold, at the instance of the accused, that the appointees were exceeding their authority in conducting this proceeding. (Emphasis supplied)

The instant case, as we have argued supra, clearly fits under the rationale that the inquisitorial nature of the grand jury makes it impossible for it to know in advance whom it will indict. The present letter, to be sure, is not confined to a particular character of cases such as mail fraud cases. But the same reason, the wide and broad range of the grand jury inquiry makes it equally inappropriate in a broad inquisitorial inquiry to name the crimes under which any indictment may be brought. And, as we argue infra, under Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919), a grand jury witness is not entitled to set the limits to such an inquiry. Finally, Shushan involved specially retained outside counsel, rather than regular Department of Justice attorneys, and since the statute is for "the protection of the United States", the Government is in no way injured when its regular attorneys appear before a grand jury pursuant to assignment. See our discussion of the 1870 Act, supra.

United States v. Hall, 145 F.2d 781, (9th Cir. 1944), cert. den., 324 U.S. 871 (1945), is the only appellate case which concerned the use of officials of the Department of Justice, rather than specially retained outside counsel. Consequently, the opinion does not talk in terms of special commissions, oaths or salary limitations. Rather, it focuses on whether participation by officers of the Department of Justice was, in fact, authorized by the Attorney General. The Court stated (145 F.2d at 785):

> We are of the opinion and so hold that the authorization may be direct to each designated officer of the Department or it may be to an officer in immediate supervision over several other such officers and may include such authorization to any or all of the several. And we are further of the opinion and we so hold that such authorization need not be directed to specifically designated cases but may be designated and limited descriptively as was done in the instant case by the Attorney General when he authorized Mr. Brett and the attorneys under his immediate direction to act in the kind of cases, to wit, such land cases as from time to time shall be assigned to the Los Angeles Lands Division office."

Here, the organizational makeup of the Criminal Division, its divisions into various sections, including the Organized Crime Section to which Mr. Del Grosso belongs, and over which the Assistant Attorney General presides, provides the designation that the Hall case would require.[14]

14 Courts have previously upheld the authority of Departmental or Special Attorneys to appear before grand juries. See United States v. Morse, 292 F. 273 (S.D.N.Y., 1922); United States v. Martins, 288 F. 991 (D. Mass., 1923); United States v. Amazon, 55 F.2d 254 (D. Md., 1931); United States v. Powell, 81 F.Supp. 288 (D. Mo., 1948); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 216 F.Supp. 25 (D. Minn., 1962); United States v. Sheffield, 43 F.Supp. (S.D.N.Y., 1942). But see United States v. Goldman, 28 F.2d 424 (D. Conn., 1928); United States v. Houston, 28 F.2d 451 (D. Ohio, 1928); United States v. Cohen, 273 F. 620 (D. Mass., 1921).

II. The Assistant Attorney General Could Properly Authorize The Department Of Justice Attorney To Appear Before The Grand Jury.

The contention that the Attorney General could not delegate his power to assign government attorneys to the grand jury to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division is answered by Judge Werker's opinion in Crispino, supra. Section 510 of Title 28 permits the Attorney General to delegate any of his functions to "any other officer" of the Department of Justice. By regulation, 28 C.F.R. 0.60 and 0.55, the Attorney General delegated his power to designate attorneys to present evidence to grand juries in all cases "assigned to, conducted, handled, or supervised by the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division" to the Assistant Attorney General. This includes prosecution of all federal crimes not otherwise specifically assigned. It included the coordination of enforcement activities against organized crime and racketeering. See May v. United States, supra, 236 Fed. at 499; see also United States v. Twining, supra, 132 Fed. at 130.[14]

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14 Contrary to appellant's contention, apart from 28 C.F.R. 0.60 which gives the Assistant Attorney General specific power to designate attorneys to appear before grand juries, the general authority given to him under 28 C.F.R. 0.55 to prosecute all federal crimes embraces the power to assign attorneys to the grand jury.

As Judge Werker concluded in Crispino (slip opinion pp. 4-5):

> It thus appears that the power to appoint Special Attorneys was properly delegated to Mr. Peterson. This is not a case of improper delegation as was found in United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). That case involved a question of delegation of power to authorize wiretaps under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2520. Section 2516(1) of that act allows the Attorney General or any Assistant Attorney General to authorize the application. The official who authorized the wiretap in Giordano was in fact the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General. The Court concluded that despite the broad delegation provision in 28 U.S.C. §510, Congress in enacting §2516(1) "intended to limit the power to authorize wiretap applications by the Attorney General himself and to any Assistant Attorney General he might designate." 416 U.S. at 514. In enacting section 515(a) . . . there was no limitation imposed on the Attorney General's ability to delegate his power of appointment of Special Attorneys to other officers of the Department of Justice such as Mr. Petersen. (Footnote omitted).

Nor is it necessary, as appellant argues, that the letters of appointment contain a statement that the assignment of a particular attorney is at the direction of the Deputy Attorney General. The regulations give the Assistant Attorney General power to act, without first receiving approval from the Deputy Attorney General.

In short, there is no substance to the claim of improper delegation.

III. A Grand Jury Witness May Not Complain About The Scope of Authority of a Government Attorney Assigned to Conduct a Grand Jury Inquiry.

Finally, a grand jury witness may not complain about the scope of authority of a government attorney to conduct a grand jury inquiry, especially where, as here, the attorney has been "specifically directed" to conduct that inquiry by an Assistant Attorney General under power delegated to him by the Attorney General.

Appellant simply has no standing to complain about the scope of the authority of the government attorney. This follows from Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919) where a grand jury witness contended that he was excused from answering questions because of the alleged invalidity of the statutes which were the subject of the inquiry. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court ruled that a witness could not set limits to the investigation or take exception to the jurisdiction of the grand jury or the court over the particular subject matter. As the court said:

> On familiar principles, he is not entitled to challenge the authority of the court or of the grand jury, provided they have a de facto existence and organization. 250 U.S. at 283.

Like principles preclude any challenge to the government attorney here. See also United States v. Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. 330. Any holding to the contrary would "saddle a grand jury with minitrials".

United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 117 (1973).

But beyond any question of standing, neither a defendant, let alone a witness, has the right to nullify grand jury proceedings on the ground here urged. Just as an indictment may not be quashed on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before a grand jury, a grand jury inquiry or an indictment is not subject to challenge because of the scope of authority of a government attorney "specifically directed" by his superiors to appear before a grand jury. Such a challenge "would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution, in which laymen conduct their inquiries unfettered by technical rules. Neither justice nor the concept of a fair trial requires such a change." Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956).

The claim here, moreover, falls into the category of a "housekeeping provision of the Department of Justice." If the letter of authority should have been limited to "organized crime" cases, in order to avoid the possibility of interference with a local United States Attorney who in turn is under the supervision of the Attorney General, this is a matter over which neither a witness nor a defendant should have a right to complain. See United States v. Sullivan, supra, at 173 where the Supreme Court, in discussing an Executive Order which the United States Attorney had failed to comply with, stated:

> It was simply a housekeeping provision of the Department and was not intended to curtail or limit the well-recognized power of the grand jury to consider and investigate any alleged crime within its jurisdiction . . .
>
> . . . The evidence was presented by the District Attorney, who was a representative of the Department of Justice, notwithstanding that he failed to comply with the departmental directive. For this he is answerable to the Department, but his action before the grand jury was not subject to attack by one indicted by the grand jury on such evidence.

Here too there may be no valid attack on the grand jury proceedings.[16]

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16 In no event was the government attorney "unauthorized" to appear before the grand jury within the meaning of the cases holding that "unathorized persons" may not appear before the grand jury. So long as he had a status recognized by Rule 6(d) and was "specifically directed" to appear by the Assistant Attorney General, he could properly appear and question appellant before the grand jury. See May v. United States, supra, 236 F.2d at 500.

POINT II

The Government's Affidavits Complied With The Requirements Of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3504

A. The Government Properly Denied The Occurrence Of Unlawful Electronic Surveillance

The Government's affidavits in response to appellant's Section 3504 motion specifically denied the occurrence of unlawful electronic surveillance as regards the appellant. The aforesaid affidavits related that appellant was the subject of three court ordered instances of electronic surveillance conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Appellant had knowledge of the aforesaid surveillance and the legality of it as a result of his January 23, 1974 grand jury appearance and this Court's decision concerning that appearance. In re Persico, 491 F.2d 156 (2d Cir., 197-). Appellant was further advised that Department of Justice files disclosed that he was not subjected to any other electronic surveillance conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and that he was never subjected to electronic surveillance by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the United States Postal Service, the United States Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, or the Bureau of Customs. The Government also related to appellant that electronic surveillance was conducted against him by the New York Police Department on two occasions and that the results of said

interception were made available to the Drug Enforcement Administration for use in a federally prosecuted case. Although appellant was not indicted, the aforesaid electronic surveillance was subsequently upheld by this Court in United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1974).

Appellant states the Government's response lacks sufficient specificity which would enable him to make a determination whether or not to invoke Title 18, United States Code, Section 2515, which limits the admissibility of intercepted wire or oral communications into evidence in the grand jury. The Government's response was sufficient on its face and appellant offered nothing to indicate the Government's affidavits were false or defective. In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 470 (3d Cir. 1972); In the Matter of Grumbles, 453 F.2d 119, 122 (3d Cir. 1971). The proper test as to the adequacy of an opponent's affirmation or denial of the occurrence of an alleged unlawful act should be one of reasonableness, which standard has been complied with as a review of the proceedings below clearly establishes. Judge Judd found the Government to have complied with appellant's claim in the practical sense (Appellant's Appendix A152) whereas the appellant has done everything including filing spurious claims in order to impede the orderly functioning of this grand jury. Appellant continues to insist that the Government intercepted a telephone conversation between himself and one Thomas DiBella. As proof

of this, appellant relies upon his grand jury testimony of December 4, 1974. A perusal of the aforesaid minutes (the Government will produce said minutes upon this Court's direction at oral argument in order to foreclose any claim that the Government violated Rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) is proof of appellant's misstatement of facts and of his deliberate attempt to avoid giving testimony. A similar claim involves appellant's statement (Appellant's Appendix A7) that an independent electronics expert's tests indicated appellant's home phone was electronically surveilled as recently as December 17, 1974. To this date, despite Government inquiries concerning the identity and findings of the aforesaid expert, appellant has failed to produce at the very least an affidavit confirming the expert's determinations. Appellant's actions are proof of his continued efforts to impede and obstruct the grand jury's efforts to discharge its responsibilities.

Appellant claims that the Government's affidavits are insufficient due to its failure to affirm or deny the occurrence of unlawful electronic surveillance with respect to premises owned or leased by him. The Government's response of February 5, 1975 (Appellant's Appendix A18) clearly stated that other than the three Orders listed in its affidavit, no conversations of the appellant were at any time overheard by electronic surveillance or that premises known to be owned,

leased, or licensed by him were covered by electronic surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (Appellant has been informed on numerous occasions that his residence at 1409 Bath Avenue, Brooklyn, New York was the situs of Court ordered electronic surveillance, said notice having been stated in an inventory pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2518(8)(d), and at his previous grand jury appearances in January, 1974).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation exclusively, has been responsible for the investigation of appellant and was the "appropriate agency" contacted, United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 281 (1974), In re Horn, supra, at 471. The Government has complied with the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3504, however, it is prepared to supplement its responses, if this Court deems it necessary, and deny any electronic surveillance by investigating agencies of the Government other than surveillance as has been previously disclosed of premises in which appellant had a known proprietary interest. The Government's supplement should be allowed in the District Court without admitting appellant to bail, said policy having been previously allowed by the First Circuit, In re Marx, 451 F.2d 466, 469 (1971).

B. Appellant Failed To Raise A Prima Facie Issue Of Electronic Surveillance Of His Counsel

The standard necessary for a claim of electronic surveillance of witness' counsel is defined in Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 752 (5th Cir. 1972). There the Court held:

> We think such affidavits should as a minimum name the counsel in question, the outside dates of attorney representation and suspected surveillance, the grand jury witnesses represented by such counsel, as well as the numbers of the telephones over which the surveillance might have occurred and any other available data tending to identify the suspected surveillance. Although "the Government has the answers", its ability within a reasonable time to come up with the answers in such a way as to offer meaningful protection to appellants' constitutional rights, should be aided by specificity and not hampered by vagueness. The district court will have wide latitude in determining the sufficiency and objectivity of factual allegations brought forth as a basis for claims of unlawful attorney surveillance. There is room for balance between due regard for the witness' constitutional rights as protected by the statute, on the one hand, and the right of the United States to proceed with reasonable promptness with its grand jury investigation, on the other. The district court by requiring sharper delineation of the possible limits of the suspected surveillance is in a position to preserve such a balance.

A review of the record (Appellant's Appendix A8) shows appellant's failure in the proceedings below to specify sufficient information to indicate electronic surveillance of his counsel. Neither the outside dates of representation,

the telephone numbers over which the surveillance might have occurred, nor any other data tending to identify the suspected surveillance is indicated. Appellant's allegations are general and conclusory and are based upon mere suspicion and conjecture.

C. Appellant Failed To Raise A Prima Facie Issue Of Electronic Surveillance Of His Counsel's Conversations With Third Parties As To Matters Confidential Between Appellant's Counsel and Him

Although appellant relies upon United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973), he fails to conform to the requirements set forth therein. In Alter, supra, at 1026, the Court held:

> To raise a prima facie issue of electronic surveillance of counsel for a grand jury witness, the affidavit(s) or other evidence in support of the claim must reveal
>
> (1) the specific facts which reasonably lead the affiant to believe that named counsel for the named witness has been subjected to electronic surveillance;
>
> (2) the dates of such suspected surveillance;
>
> (3) the outside dates of representation of the witness by the lawyer during the period of surveillance;
>
> (4) the identity of the person(s), by name or description, together with their respective telephone numbers, with whom the lawyer (or his agents or employees) was communicating at the time the claimed surveillance took place; and
>
> (5) facts showing some connection between

possible electronic surveillance and the grand jury witness who asserts the claim or the grand jury proceeding in which the witness is involved.

When these elements appear by affidavit or other evidence the Government must affirm or deny illegal surveillance pursuant to 18 United States Code, Section 3504(a). (See Beverly v. United States (5th Cir. 1972) 468 F.2d 732.)

Again as in paragraph B above, a review of the record (Appellant's Appendix A8) demonstrates appellant's failure below to specify the requisite information. Briefly appellant failed to allege specific facts to indicate belief that his counsel had been electronically surveilled, the identity of the person(s) with whom appellant's counsel was communicating at the time of the claimed surveillance, and such facts showing some connection between possible electronic surveillance and the appellant or the grand jury proceeding in which the witness is involved. Appellant did not allege a sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural affidavit to enable the Court to conclude that a substantial claim was presented, Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1967), and thus failed to create the necessary balance among the competing demands of constitutional safeguards designed to protect the witness and the need for orderly grand jury processing.

POINT III

The District Court Correctly Prevented Appellant's Counsel From Examining The Orders And Supporting Papers Authorizing The Electronic Surveillance of Appellant's Home

In his January 23, 1974 grand jury appearance, appellant claimed a right to examine those documents authorizing electronic surveillance of his home. This Court, In re Persico, supra, affirmed the facial validity of those papers as well as denied a grand jury witness' or his counsel's right to examine said documents during the pendency of a grand jury proceeding.

Conclusion

The judgment of civil contempt should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING

State of New York)
County of New York)

Barbara S. Ambler

deposes and says that she is employed in the office of the Joint Strike Force for the Southern District of New York.

That on the 14th day of March, 1975 she served a copy of the within Brief by placing the same in a properly postpaid franked enveloped addressed:

Nancy Rosner, Esq.
401 Broadway
New York
New York 10013

And deponent further says that she sealed the said envelope and placed the same in the mail chute drop for mailing in the United States Courthouse, Foley Square, Borough of Manhattan, City of New York.

Barbara S. Ambler

Sworn to before me this
14th day of March 1975.

Carl M. Bornstein

CARL M. BORNSTEIN
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 31-0359368
Qualified in New York County
Commission Expires March 30, 1975